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Texas Finds Cover  
from U.S. Economic Storm
By Fiona Sigalla
A Texas recession isn’t   
in the forecast. A 
relatively low cost of living 
continues to attract firms 
and residents to the state, 
and an economy that 
is more globally 
integrated than in 
other states boosts   
demand for Texas 
products and services.
The 2007 Texas expansion was persistent-
ly underrated. While a national economic 
slowdown attracted headlines, the state’s 
economy quietly grew at a rate that was 
Texas proud. 
  State job growth of 3.1 percent last 
year was triple the nation’s 1 percent—and 
exceeded the state’s long-run average of 2.8 
percent for the third year in a row (Chart 
1).1 While declines in homebuilding were 
sizable, overall construction remained at 
high levels in Texas. Oil and gas drilling 
returned to heights not seen since the early 
1980s energy boom. 
  Storm clouds rolled in around midsum-
mer as it became apparent that the nation’s 
housing and credit problems were spread-
ing into the broader economy. The U.S. 
economy began to slow, reducing demand 
for Texas goods and services. 
  The nation’s woes have stirred up 
headwinds for the state’s expansion. Credit 
market disruptions and a deflating U.S. 
housing bubble have transmitted financial 
problems to lenders and builders in the 
state. Oil prices that threatened to hit $100 
per barrel strained business budgets and 
consumer pocketbooks. How quickly and 
how much the U.S. economy will slow re-
mains uncertain.
  A Texas recession isn’t in the forecast. 
A relatively low cost of living continues to 
attract firms and residents to the state, and 
an economy that is more globally integrated 
than in other states boosts demand for Tex-
as products and services. The state remains 
the global epicenter for a prosperous en-
ergy industry. And while real estate activity 
is slowing, Texas markets are healthier than 
those in many other parts of the country. 
  The Texas economy had a full head of 
steam as the storm arrived, and odds are 
good that it will handily outperform the rest 
of the country in 2008. Even so, the expan-
sion will probably be below average for the 
state, with job growth likely near 2 percent.
Chart 1














* Year over year.
SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Texas Workforce Commission; seasonal and other adjustments by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.SouthwestEconomy      4      FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2008        
Extreme Construction and Lending 
  Seeds of the storm were sown during 
the recent expansion. Low interest rates and 
innovative lending practices stimulated a 
homebuying frenzy.2 Construction surged 
in the U.S. and Texas, boosting nationwide 
demand for the state’s builders and manu-
facturers of construction-related products. 
  With plentiful land and labor, Texas 
builders largely met demand, keeping 
home-price increases modest. But in other 
parts of the country, where land and labor 
are less abundant, builders had a hard 
time keeping pace. The supply of avail-
able homes tightened and prices climbed 
(Chart 2). Investors saw prices rise and 
bought homes in anticipation of continued 
increases. In some instances, wealth from 
accelerating home prices was used to fi-
nance larger homes than salary incomes 
permitted.
  Rising home prices fueled consumer 
spending because homeowners felt pros-
perous. Home-equity loans allowed in-
creased consumption. With the state’s 
relatively weak home-price appreciation, 
Texans didn’t feel as wealthy or have as 
large a spending boost as homeowners in 
other parts of the country. Still, the state’s 
factories and service firms benefited from 
the national consumer spending spree.
  The concept of spending wealth from 
rising asset prices works as long as the 
prices keep rising. But home-price increases 
in some parts of the country were from a 
speculative bubble. In late 2005, U.S. home 
construction caught up with demand as 
speculative investment eased and home 
inventories began to climb. In areas with 
rising inventories, prices started to fall. 
Homeowners felt less wealthy, and consum-
er spending began to slow.
  In early 2007, uncertainty about the 
true value of many of the nation’s homes 
took hold.3 Financial markets became con-
cerned about the declining value of real 
estate. In hindsight, it was apparent that 
lending practices did not adequately ac-
count for the risk of price declines. 
  Lenders pulled back from real estate 
investments in midsummer. Credit standards 
tightened. Innovative loans that were used 
to finance much of the expansion became 
unavailable even to the best borrowers. As 
financial markets struggle to value outstand-
ing assets, some lending—both residential 
and nonresidential—is on hold. 
  The adjustment in housing and credit 
markets isn’t over. 
  The banking system is welcoming back 
many of the more creditworthy customers, 
but the process is expected to take some 
time. Many large lenders in Texas are na-
tional companies that have taken enough 
losses that their lending may be constrained 
by a lack of bank capital. 
  Home construction is still dipping, and 
nonresidential construction shows signs of 
softening. U.S. home prices continue to de-
cline, and homeowners are modifying their 
spending to reflect less wealth. Some loans 
that were used to finance the boom have 
adjustable interest rates scheduled to reset 
in 2008 and beyond. Further complicating 
the economic landscape are high food and 
energy prices, which are straining business 
and consumer spending.
Texas’ Advantages
  Texas will be affected by these eco-
nomic challenges, but the Lone Star State 
has advantages that will help it weather 
the storm in 2008. Signs suggest that these 
advantages are weakening, but the state 
should still outpace the nation in growth. 
  The global advantage. Texas exports 
more than any other state. Its international 
connections, large seaport and good distri-
bution network help businesses find global 
markets when U.S. demand slows. 
  In 2007, international demand was 
strong for such Texas specialties as chemi-
cals, machinery and agricultural products. 
The state’s chemical industry relies on natu-
ral gas as an input more than oil, which is 
heavily used in other countries. Oil prices 
rose faster than natural gas prices last year, 
giving Texas chemicals a cost advantage.
  Over the past year, U.S. and Texas 
exports have been stimulated by declines 
in the dollar’s value that have made these 
products less expensive in many countries. 
Not surprisingly, the rise in Texas exports 
has been greatest where currencies have 
appreciated the most against the dollar. 
Shipments experienced double-digit growth 
to France, Germany, Brazil, India, Japan, 
Singapore and Taiwan. 
  The state has received less of a boost 
from its largest trading partner. Export 
growth to Mexico slowed in 2007.4 The 
peso’s value didn’t appreciate much against 
the dollar last year. The state also saw fewer 
benefits from Mexico’s maquiladora plants 
because demand for their products softened 
along with the slowing U.S. economy.
  The energy advantage. Texas is one 
of the few states that can claim high energy 
prices as an advantage. In early 2007, fu-
tures markets didn’t forecast $100-per-barrel 
oil, but that is close to where prices ended 
the year. Rising oil prices pushed up other 
energy prices, including natural gas and 
gasoline.
  High energy costs dampen economic 
activity and slow U.S. growth. But for Texas, 
high prices stimulated worldwide demand 
for equipment and services and led to a 
resurgence of drilling in the state. Producers 
Chart 2











’07 ’06 ’05 ’04 ’03 ’02 ’01 ’00 ’99 ’98 ’97 ’96 ’95 ’94 ’93 ’92 ’91 ’90
U.S.
Texas
* Four-month moving average.
SOURCES: National Association of Realtors; Texas A&M Real Estate Center; seasonal and other adjustments by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2008    5    SouthwestEconomy
can afford to use expensive new technolo-
gies to profitably extract natural gas from 
ground previously thought impenetrable. 
The drilling surge has meant additional 
property owners are profiting from their 
mineral rights. More royalty checks are be-
ing cashed, and high oil and natural gas 
prices make payments larger. 
  While the state benefits more than 
others from high energy prices, expensive 
oil, natural gas, electricity and gasoline still 
create burdens. Not all Texans own mineral 
rights or work in the energy industry. As 
costs rise, businesses reduce production. 
Consumers forced to spend more on gaso-
line, heating and air-conditioning cut back 
on other expenditures. 
  The labor force advantage. Texans 
are among the state’s biggest assets—they 
provide the labor necessary for strong job 
growth. In recent years, the population has 
grown twice as fast in Texas as the rest of 
the country (see “Noteworthy” on page 15). 
  Rapid job growth has given the state 
an increasing share of U.S. employment 
(Chart 3). Roughly 7.6 percent of the coun-
try’s nonagricultural workforce is in Texas, 
and that figure is growing. Last year, the 
Texas economy added workers at a faster 
rate than the nation in all sectors, with the 
state creating 31 percent of the country’s 
private nonagricultural jobs. The Texas con-
struction sector added 27,000 jobs—up 4.3 
percent—while U.S. construction employ-
ment fell by 222,000—down 2.9 percent.  
  In fact, Texas job growth was so strong   
that throughout 2007, firms said the inabil-
ity to find qualified talent was restraining 
growth. The Dallas Beige Book, the Fed’s 
anecdotal survey of business conditions, 
pointed to shortages of skilled workers 
such as welders, mechanics, engineers and 
information technology specialists. 
  The labor market softened toward 
year-end, although reports suggest the 
market is still quite tight. In November, con-
tinuing claims for unemployment insurance 
dipped to the lowest level since 1982. The 
state unemployment rate rose to 4.5 percent 
in December but remained well below the 
U.S. rate of 5.1. For now, many firms say 
they are trying to minimize layoffs because 
workers are in such short supply. 
  The real estate advantage. Texas real 
estate markets are no strangers to boom-
and-bust cycles. A construction spike in the 
early 1980s left a large inventory of homes, 
offices and retail space that took a decade 
for the state to absorb. Memories of earlier 
excesses may have helped temper building 
here in the face of rapid growth in the rest 
of the country. More likely, Texas real estate 
markets have stayed closer to fundamentals 
because strong economic growth absorbed 
new space as fast as builders could gener-
ate it.
  With plentiful land, relatively few regu-
lations and a large crew of workers, the 
Texas construction industry knows how to 
boom. Between 2000 and 2007, the state 
added over 1 million single-family homes. 
Even with this surge, the supply of homes 
doesn’t appear to be too far ahead of de-
mand. 
  At the end of 2007, it took just over six 
months for the average existing home to 
sell in Texas (Chart 4). The time it takes to 
sell an average home nationally is pushing 
above 10 months, and high inventories are 
Chart 3
Texas Share of U.S. Employment
Percent                                 Percent



























* Four-month moving average.















SOURCES: National Association of Realtors; Texas A&M Real Estate Center; seasonal and other adjustments by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.SouthwestEconomy      6      FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2008        
putting downward pressure on prices. With 
lower inventories in Texas, prices may re-
cede but large declines aren’t expected. 
  The relatively weak home-price in-
creases in Texas led to smaller consumer 
spending increases than in other parts of 
the nation. That disadvantage became an 
advantage for the state economy as home 
prices began to fall rapidly in some parts of 
the country. Texas will be less affected than 
other areas by the loss of this stimulus. 
  However, Texas isn’t immune to hous-
ing woes elsewhere. Relocating homeown-
ers may be unable to complete transactions 
in this state if they can’t sell their proper-
ties back home (see “Hot Housing Market 
Catching Cold in Texas” on page 11).
  Nonresidential real estate markets 
have been a boon for the state since 2006, 
although that advantage has begun to di-
minish as well. When Texas homebuilding 
weakened last year, nonresidential activ-
ity picked up and was sufficient at first 
to compensate for cutbacks in residential 
construction. Numerous office, retail, en-
ergy and recreational facilities sprouted up 
across the state.
  Several very large projects remain un-
der construction in 2008, but nonresidential 
activity—while still at high levels—has 
begun to wind down.
Financial Strain
  While not riding the boom-and-bust 
cycle seen in other parts of the country, the 
state’s homeowners are feeling financial 
strain. Per capita income in Texas is below 
the U.S. average, and the state is home to 
some of the country’s lowest-income coun-
ties. Many residents are particularly hard 
hit by high food and energy costs. Mort-
gage debt is becoming a burden for some 
Texans—more than for people in many 
other parts of the country. 
  In other states, rapidly rising home 
prices helped homeowners refinance or ex-
tract home equity to relieve financial pres-
sures. Because Texas home prices didn’t 
increase much, the state’s homeowners 
built relatively little equity, leaving many 
with a thin financial cushion.5
  Moreover, the percentage of higher-
priced mortgage loans issued in Texas has 
been above average compared with other 
states.6 In Texas’ metropolitan statistical ar-
eas (MSAs), 30 percent of loans originated 
in 2006 were considered higher-priced—at 
least 3 percentage points above prevailing 
mortgage rates or the Treasury security of 
equivalent duration. This figure exceeded 
the percentages in most of the nation’s 12 
largest metro areas.7
  Higher-priced loans were heavily used 
in several of the state’s MSAs, particularly 
along the Texas–Mexico border (see map). 
The highest percentage was in McAllen–
Edinburg–Mission, where such loans ac-
counted for over half of the lending.
  A closer look at the data gives addi-
tional insight into which Texans received 
higher-priced loans.
  Just under a quarter of upper-income 
borrowers in Texas were issued higher-
priced loans, while nearly half of moderate-
income and 44 percent of low-income 
borrowers received such loans. 
  Single more than joint borrowers were 
most likely to be issued higher-priced loans. 
Over 35 percent of loans that went to single 
filers were higher-priced, compared with 19 
percent for joint filers. Of single filers, the 
percentage for male and female borrowers 
was roughly equal. 
  More than 50 percent of loans issued 
to Hispanic or Latino borrowers and over 
60 percent of loans issued to black or 
African-American borrowers were higher-
priced. Fewer than 20 percent made to 
white non-Hispanic borrowers were higher-
priced. 
  Other data suggest Texans are experi-
encing financial strain. 
  Home foreclosures in the state in-
creased to 0.6 percent in third quarter 
2007—slightly below the U.S. rate of 0.8 
percent. Mortgage delinquencies also rose. 
Texas delinquencies for all loans 90 days 
past due were 1.6 percent in the quarter—
higher than the U.S. rate of 1.3 percent 
(Chart 5).
  Delinquencies for subprime loans— 
those that have higher interest rates—
increased sharply. Delinquencies for sub-
prime adjustable-rate mortgages, or ARMs, 
reached 6.5 percent in Texas in the third 
quarter, higher than the nation’s 5.3 percent 
(Chart 6). 
Slowing Growth in 2008
  After seeing strong growth for most of 
2007, the Texas economy has downshifted. 
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  The Beige Book suggests the state’s 
economy weakened rapidly in fourth 
quarter 2007. Consumer spending has 
softened, and some manufacturing activity 
has declined, particularly for construction-
related products. Indexes from the Dallas 
Fed’s Texas Manufacturing Outlook Sur-
vey (TMOS) have been signaling slowing 
growth for nearly a year. 
  Other indicators point to a slowing 
economy. The Fed’s Texas Leading Index 
has been sluggish since late 2006. Employ-
ment of temporary workers has declined for 
the past five months; temp hiring has been 
a leading indicator of total employment 
growth in Texas. 
  Uncertainty has piqued the outlook. 
The Beige Book and TMOS indicate that 
some companies are planning for more lim-
ited growth in 2008, reducing capital spend-
ing and other purchases. 
  Challenges are on the horizon, but 
Texas enjoys advantages that will help it 
continue to outpace the nation.
Sigalla is an economist in the Research Depart-
ment of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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Residential Mortgage Delinquency Rates
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